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Abstract 
 
 Are formal institutions instrumental in the effect globalization mechanisms have on 
the human face? If so, through which freedoms channels are poverty and inequality 
mitigated? With the instrumentality of formal institutions: (1) de jure financial liberalization 
(KAOPEN) has a positive income-redistribution impact while the de facto measure (FDI) 
does not; (2) political liberalization has a disequalizing effect and; (3) economic freedom has 
a positive (negative) effect on inequality (poverty). Hence, economic freedom does not stop 
the wealthy from growing wealthier, but at the same time provides for conditions that mitigate 
poverty. The findings broadly show that, despite the substantially documented negative 
incidences of some channels of globalization on poverty (and inequality), formal institutions 
have the capacity to device policies that will give capital openness, trade and economic 
liberalizations a human face. Social implications and policy options are discussed.  
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1. Introduction  
 Globalization has been recognized as the principal force currently dominating the 
economic universe. It upholds to illuminate the world with economic prosperity and seeks a 
victory of markets over governments and self-interest over altruism. Even more imperative is 
the global commitment to continuing and accelerating the pace of human development which 
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signifies the culmination of the historical processes of cultural progress. The dilemma 
however is that, while globalization is a lusty ineluctable historical process whose march can 
be halted only by endangering the prosperity of peoples and nations, it also threatens to 
disfigure human development in the manner it is evolving. Accordingly, as a dynamic force 
for change throughout the world, it is expected to cause unprecedented surges in the wealth of 
nation by extending the world’s production possibility frontier outward and redefining the 
world as a “Global Village” (Asongu, 2013a). Conversely, it is also reviled as a process 
destined to cause social and economic disintegration as well as ecological decay. It is also 
feared to be accelerating the race to the bottom by grabbing from the poor and giving to the 
rich, marginalizing nations already integrated in the world economy and decoupling them 
from scientific advancements performed in the developed world. The phenomenon is 
deepening pre-existing hollows in the levels of economic wellbeing within and between 
nations to a threshold where they have become socially, morally and economically 
unacceptable. These have mushroomed increase fears that developed countries may 
increasingly use globalization to enact disguised colonialism. Hence, not surprisingly the 
public support for globalization has waned in both developed and developing countries with a 
frantic search for a third dimension out of the morally enervating regime of unvarnished 
capitalism.  
The current wave of politico-economic globalization began in the 1980s with growing 
cross border financial flows among industrial countries as well as among developing 
economies. This was facilitated by the liberalization of capital controls in many of these 
economies since it was widely anticipated that improved cross-border flows would bring 
higher gains in terms of better capital allocation and improved possibilities of international 
risk-sharing. Some scholars and policy makers have been of the view that, these benefits 
ought to be high for developing countries that have more volatile income growth and tend to 
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be relatively capital-poor (Kose et al., 2006). Accordingly, with the surge in financial inflows 
came a spade of currency and financial turmoils in the late 1980s and 1990s. This pattern set 
the course for many policy makers to begin advocating that developing countries which 
opened-up their capital accounts have been more vulnerable to crises (and consequently more 
adversely affected) than their industrial counterparts (Kose et al., 2011; Henry, 2007; Asongu, 
2013b,c). These developments have ignited a fierce and heated debate among academics and 
practitioners of globalization policies. While the debate over the positive gains from trade 
liberalization has moved towards a consensus (Kose et al., 2006), that on other globalization 
policies (especially capital account openness) has intensified and become more polarized 
(Asongu, 2013b,c). 
In the 1980s and 1990s, most African countries embarked on a chain of globalization 
oriented measures (structural and policy adjustments at financial, economic and political 
levels) with the goal of given impetus to economic growth as well as improving overall 
economic and human development (Janine & Elbadawi, 1992; Asongu, 2013c). In the first 
generation of reforms, adopted policies revolved around: reducing direct government 
intervention in bank credit decisions, abolishing explicit control on the pricing and allocation 
of credit, relaxing of control on international capital movements and, allowing of interests 
rates to be market determined. Second generation reforms targeted institutional and structural 
constraints, notably: improvement of the legal, regulatory, supervisory and institutional 
environments, restoring of bank soundness and, rehabilitation of financial infrastructure 
(Batuo et al., 2010). Unfortunately, despite over two decades of globalization reforms, 
poverty and inequality in Africa have remained stubbornly high (Asongu, 2013d).  As far as 
we have reviewed, while a substantial bulk of the literature has examined the impact of global 
reforms on financial development and growth (Cho, 1986; Arestis et al., 2002; Batuo & 
Kupukile, 2010), the current bulk of studies that have investigated the pro-poor globalization 
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channels in Africa have either been theoretical or limited to appraising first generation 
reforms for the most part (Nissanke & Thorbecke, 2005, 2008; Sindzingre, 2005).  
With increasing universal demand to recapture some of its attractive glow and lofty 
ambitions, that the superior claims of globalization be given a “human face” by saddling the 
increasingly ungovernable world of trade and finance with a global civic ethic, the present 
study aims to investigate two main issues arising: (1) whether institutions are instrumental in 
the effect of globalization on the human face and; (2) assessing the freedom channels of 
globalization that matter for the instrumentality of formal institutions in poverty and 
inequality reduction. By employing a plethora of globalization policies (financial, trade, 
institutional, political ...etc.), we present a broad and exhaustive picture of the nexuses 
between globalization and poverty. Moreover, the use of much recent data provides findings 
with more focused and updated policy implications. The rest of the paper is organized as 
follows. Data and methodology are discussed and outlined respectively in Section 2. Section 3 
is devoted to empirical analysis. We conclude with Section 4. 
 
2. Data and Methodology 
2.1 Data 
 We examine a panel of 28 African countries with data from the World Development 
Indicators (WDI), Chinn & Ito (2002) and Gwartney et al. (2011) for the period 1996-2010. 
The latter and the latest sources provide measurements of “de jure capital openness” 
(KAOPEN) and economic freedom respectively. Limitations to the number of countries and 
periodicity of analysis are twofold: the motivation of capturing the effects of second 
generation reforms and constraints in data availability on inequality, poverty and the quality 
of institutions. The dependent variables include: the GINI index and the poverty headcount 
ratio (less than $2 per day) for the appreciation of income-inequality and poverty respectively. 
Data on poverty is so scarce; nonetheless since scholarly focus on African poverty is rare 
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owing to lack of relevant data, we have employed the few degrees of freedom we could fetch 
from the WDI.  
 In the study, we distinguish among four types of liberalization policies that come with 
globalization: financial, trade, political and other liberalizations. Firstly, financial 
liberalization is measured by: de jure capital account openness (KAPOPEN) developed by 
Chinn & Ito (2002); and de facto capital account openness (foreign direct investment: FDI). 
KAOPEN is the first principal component of four binary variables in the IMF’s Annual 
Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER) and it takes higher 
values for more open financial regimes. We are motivated to add subtlety to the analysis by 
complementing KAOPEN with FDI because: (1) the former may not capture the actual ebb 
and flow of cross border capital and its impact (Aizenman et al., 2009); (2) the private sector 
often circumvents capital account restrictions, nullifying the expected effect of regulatory 
capital controls (Edwards, 1999) and; (3) more recently, China’s de facto openness, despite its 
de jure closeness has been subject to discussion in research circles (Prasad & Wei, 2007; 
Aizenman & Glick, 2009; Shah & Patnaik, 2009). Secondly, trade liberalization is measured 
by trade openness and exports. While the former is the sum of imports and exports of 
commodities as a % of GDP, the latter only consists of commodity exports as a % of GDP. 
Thirdly, political liberalization is appreciated by the Polity IV index and democracy. Fourthly, 
the other liberalization measure is economic freedom which broadly represents: freedom to 
trade internationally; legal structure and security of property rights; access to sound money; 
size of government (expenditures, taxes and enterprises) and; regulation of credit, labor and 
business.  
Government quality instrumental variables include: corruption, government 
effectiveness, political stability (no violence), rule of law, regulation quality, corruption-
control and voice & accountability. Owing to constraints in degrees of freedom indispensible 
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for the overidentifying restrictions (OIR) Sargan test
1
, we can only employ one control 
variable. We control for the wealth of nations with economic prosperity (GDP growth). 
Accordingly, we expect economic prosperity to mitigate poverty and inequality if its fruits are 
evenly distributed owing to the instrumentality of formal institutions.  
 Details about variable definitions and corresponding data sources, summary statistics 
(with presentation of countries) and correlation analysis (showing the basic correlations 
among key variables employed in the paper) are presented in the appendices. The summary 
statistics (Panel A of Appendix 1) of the variables used in the regressions show that, there is 
quite a degree of variation in the data used such that one should be comfortable and confident 
that reasonable estimated nexuses will emerge. Panel B of the summary statistics presents the 
countries funneled from constraints in data availability. The object of the correlation analysis 
(Appendix 2) is to mitigate concerns of overparametization and multicolinearity. From an 
initial assessment (based on the correlation coefficients), there do not appear to be any issues 
in terms of the nexuses to be estimated. The definition of the variables and corresponding 
sources are presented in Appendix 3.  
 
2.2 Methodology  
We are concerned with endogeneity for four main reasons: (1) the government quality 
instrumental variables are perception based measures that are subject to a high degree of 
media propaganda; (2) we might have omitted some variables of government quality not 
incorporated in the WDI; (3) while globalization affects poverty, it cannot be ruled-out that 
the state of poverty (and inequality) in countries shape liberalization polices, hence an issue of 
reverse causality and; (4) the problem statement by definition presupposes the existence of 
                                                 
1
 An OIR test is only employable in the presence of over-identification. That is, the instruments must be higher 
than the endogenous explaining variables by at least one degree of freedom. In the cases of exact-identification 
(instruments equal to endogenous explaining variables) and under-identifications (instruments less than 
endogenous explaining variables) an OIR test is by definition not possible. 
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endogeneity by its contingency on the use of instrumental variables. To tackle the 
endogeneity concern, we shall first assess its presence with the Hausman test before 
employing an estimation technique that is relevant to the outcome of the test.    
We adopt a Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) Instrumental Variable (IV) estimation 
technique for two reasons: on the one hand, it addresses the puzzle of endogeneity and; on the 
other hand, it is compatible with the problem statement of the study which aims to assess the 
instrumentality of formal institutions in the effect of freedom channels on poverty (and 
inequality). Accordingly, IV estimation addresses the puzzle of endogeneity and hence avoids 
the inconsistency of estimated coefficients by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) when the 
exogenous variables are correlated with the error term in the main equation.  
We adopt the following steps in the IV analysis: (1) justify the choice of a 2SLS over 
an OLS estimation technique with the Hausman-test for endogeneity; (2) verify the 
instruments are exogenous to the endogenous components of the explaining variables 
(globalization freedom channels) and; (3) ensure the instruments are valid and not correlated 
with the error-term in the main equation with an Over-identifying Restrictions (OIR) test. 
Further robustness checks will be ensured with; (1) robust Heteroscedasticity and 
Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) standard errors and; (2) the use of three-year non-
overlapping intervals (NOI) to mitigate short-run disturbances that may loom substantially 
large. 
 
3. Empirical analysis 
3.1 Presentation of results   
 This section aims to tackle the two main issues highlighted in the motivation of the 
paper, notably: (1) whether institutions are instrumental in the effect of globalization on the 
human face and; (2) assessing the freedom channels of globalization that matter for the 
instrumentality of formal institutions in poverty and inequality reduction. While the first issue 
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is addressed by the Sargan OIR test, tackling the second depends on both the results of the 
Sargan OIR test and the significance of estimated coefficients. The null hypothesis of the 
Sargan test is the position that the instruments explain inequality (poverty) only through the 
globalization freedom mechanisms, conditional on economic prosperity (control variable). 
Hence, a rejection of this null hypothesis is a rejection of the view that the government quality 
instruments do not explain inequality (poverty) beyond the globalization channels. A 
Hausman test is performed prior to every 2SLS-IV approach. The null hypothesis of this test 
is the stance that estimated coefficients by OLS are efficient and consistent. Hence, a rejection 
of this null hypothesis points to the concern of endogeneity due to inconsistent estimates and 
hence, lends credit to the choice of the IV estimation technique. Accordingly, but for a few 
exceptions in the poverty models (of Table2), there is an overwhelming rejection of the null 
hypothesis of the Hausman, hence, lending credit to the appropriateness of the choice of an IV 
estimation technique.  
As concerns the first issue, the failure to reject the null hypothesis of the Sargan test in 
most of the models is an indication that, formal institutions are instrumental in the effect 
globalization freedom channels have on the human face. Concerning the second issue, the 
following could be established: (1) de jure capital account openness and trade openness 
mitigate inequality while economic freedom (polity IV) increases it (Table 1); (2) economic 
freedom decreases poverty while polity IV increases it (Table 2) and; (3) the control variable 
of economic prosperity is significant with the right sign, meaning with the right institutions in 
place, economic prosperity mitigates inequality because the fruits of the prosperity are evenly 
distributed.   
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Table 1: Effect on Inequality   
 Dependent variable: GINI coefficient 
  Full Data 3 Year NOI 
  Without HAC SE Robust  HAC SE Without HAC SE Robust  HAC SE 
Constant -26.802* -39.940* -26.802 -39.940* -1.281 -11.088 -1.281 -11.088 
 (-1.668) (-1.759) (-1.261) (-1.717) (-0.037) (-0.178) (-0.027) (-0.253) 
 
Financial 
Liberalization 
Kaopen -4.22*** -4.69*** -4.22*** -4.69*** -3.345 -4.110 -3.345 -4.110* 
 (-4.068) (-3.500) (-2.712) (-3.013) (-1.645) (-1.236) (-1.345) (-1.741) 
FDI 0.755 1.121 0.755 1.121 0.120 1.387 0.120 1.387 
 (0.987) (1.057) (0.645) (0.744) (0.053) (0.355) (0.041) (0.401) 
 
Trade 
Liberalization  
Trade  -0.112* --- -0.112 --- -0.093 --- -0.093 --- 
 (-1.741)  (-1.587)  (-0.921)  (-1.113)  
Exports --- -0.231 --- -0.231 --- -0.285 --- -0.285 
  (-1.471)  (-1.348)  (-0.877)  (-1.156) 
 
Political 
Liberalization 
Demo --- 0.294 --- 0.294 --- 0.511 --- 0.511 
  (0.993)  (0.984)  (0.772)  (1.489) 
Polity IV 0.423** --- 0.423** --- 0.546* --- 0.546** --- 
 (2.431)  (2.273)  (1.867)  (2.201)  
          
Economic Freedom  13.00*** 15.23*** 13.00*** 15.23*** 9.681* 11.802 11.802 11.802* 
 (5.355) (4.132) (4.013) (3.976) (1.938) (1.217) (1.217) (1.821) 
         
Economic Prosperity  -1.67*** -2.26*** -1.67*** -2.261** -2.591** -3.730** -2.591 -3.730* 
 (-2.838) (-2.819) (-2.391) (-2.392) (-2.070) (-1.962) (-1.544) (-1.669) 
         
Hausman test  64.11*** 63.17*** 64.11*** 63.17*** 30.95*** 29.70*** 30.95*** 29.706*** 
 [0.000 ] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Sargan OIR  0.040 2.129 0.040 2.129 0.003 0.764 0.003 0.764 
 [0.839 ] [0.144] [0.839] [0.144] [0.956] [0.381] [0.956] [0.381] 
Adjusted R² 0.368 0.322 0.368 0.322 0.263 0.210 0.263 0.210 
Fischer  15.70*** 12.04*** 15.90*** 8.279*** 5.704*** 3.980*** 14.73*** 6.375*** 
Number of Observations  136 136 136 136 65 65 65 65 
         
*;**;***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Z-statistics in parentheses.  [ ]: P-values. GINI: Inequality coefficient. OIR: 
Overidentifying restrictions. Polity IV: First Political liberalization measure. Demo: Second Political liberalization measure. FDI: Foreign 
Direct Investment. Kaopen: de jure measure of capital account openness. HAC SE: Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent 
standard errors. NOI: Non-overlapping intervals.  
 
Table 2: Effect on Poverty   
 Dependent variable: Poverty Head Count Ratio 
  Full Data 3 Year NOI 
  Without HAC SE Robust  HAC SE Without HAC SE Robust  HAC SE 
Constant 446.37** 119.667 446.37** 119.66 280.2*** 231.87** 280.2*** 231.87*** 
 (2.186) (1.537) (2.089) (1.149) (2.628) (2.115) (3.921) (3.558) 
 
Financial 
Liberalization 
Kaopen 16.494 -2.556 16.494 -2.556 10.967 9.376 10.967 9.376 
 (1.272) (-0.454) (1.637) (-0.496) (1.096) (0.472) (1.499) (0.568) 
FDI 0.897 0.849 0.897 0.849 2.553 1.833 2.553 1.833 
 (0.113) (0.135) (0.167) (0.097) (0.234) (0.107) (0.270) (0.116) 
 
Trade 
Liberalization  
Trade  -1.119 ---   -1.119 --- -0.872 --- -0.872 --- 
 (-1.418)  (-1.413)  (-1.146)  (-1.212)  
Exports --- -1.649 --- -1.649 --- -1.273 --- -1.273 
  (-1.258)  (-1.057)  (-0.499)  (-0.537) 
 
Political 
Liberalization 
Demo --- 1.532 --- 1.532 --- 3.495 --- 3.495** 
  (0.847)  (1.027)  (1.075)  (2.399) 
Polity IV 5.758** --- 5.758** --- 3.376** --- 3.376** --- 
 (2.326)  (2.389)  (2.221)  (2.345)  
          
Economic Freedom  -48.65** --- -48.65** --- -28.759* -24.859 -28.75** -24.85 
 (-1.966)  (-2.192)  (-1.855) (-1.033) (-2.647) (-1.297) 
         
Economic Prosperity  -4.980 -3.994 -4.980 -3.994 -0.834 -0.661 -0.834 -0.661 
 (-0.712) (-0.723) (-0.609) (-0.551) (-0.117) (-0.050) (-0.134) (-0.055) 
         
Hausman test  20.77*** 1.994 20.77*** 1.994 15.524** 8.315 15.524** 8.315 
 [0.002 ] [0.849] [0.002] [0.849] [0.016] [0.215] [0.016] [0.215] 
Sargan OIR  0.010 8.429** 0.010 8.429** 0.023 2.463 0.023 2.463 
 [0.919 ] [0.014] [0.919] [0.014] [0.876] [0.116] [0.876] [0.116] 
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Adjusted R² 0.238 0.079 0.238 0.079 0.219 0.148 0.219 0.148 
Fischer  1.987 1.217 5.611*** 2.128* 2.784** 2.141* 10.37*** 10.787*** 
Number of Observations  27 32 27 32 32 32 32 32 
         
*;**;***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Z-statistics in parentheses.  [ ]: P-values. Poverty: Headcount on less than 2$ 
a day.. OIR: Overidentifying restrictions. Polity IV: First Political liberalization measure. Demo: Second Political liberalization measure. 
FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. Kaopen: de jure measure of capital account openness. HAC SE: Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation 
Consistent standard errors. NOI: Non-overlapping intervals.  
 
 
3.2 Discussion of results  
Before diving into the discussion of results, it is important to highlight two main 
practical difficulties. Firstly comparing the results of inequality (Table 1) with those of 
poverty (Table 2) may appear not so common place because of the substantial difference in 
degrees of freedom. The absence of a substantial change in the number of observations as one 
moves from “full data” to three-year NOI in Table 2 confirms the issue of shortage in degrees 
of freedom in the poverty data we have earlier discussed in the data section.  Hence, we are 
aware of the risk of comparing results from the two tables and further argue that, applied 
econometrics has other tasks than the mere conformity to important (and comparable) degrees 
of freedom before empirical analysis. Our argument further holds grounds on two counts. 
Firstly, there are no other sources of data on poverty beside that from the WDI and, scholarly 
focus has avoided employing the poverty headcount ratio because of the issues already 
covered above. Secondly, the effect of economic freedom on poverty and inequality is 
antagonistic which may raise further doubts as to whether the two tables are indeed 
comparable owing to the limited degrees of freedom in the second. Nonetheless, we shall 
carry on with the discussion contingent on the caveat that, the interpretations should be treated 
with caution in light of the points discussed above. 
The inequality mitigating effect of de jure capital account openness and trade 
openness point the fact that, formal institutions have the capacity to device policies that will 
give capital and trade account liberalizations a human face. Three points are worth discussing. 
Firstly, as concerns financial liberalization, only the de jure KAOPEN indicator has a 
mitigating effect on inequality as opposed to the de facto FDI measure. It should be noted 
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that, more recently, China’s de facto openness, despite its de jure closeness has been subject 
to discussion in research circles (Prasad & Wei, 2007; Aizenman & Glick, 2009; Shah  & 
Patnaik, 2009). The two financial liberalization measures differ principally in the point that, 
the former measures de jure capital openness by accounting for regulatory restrictions on 
capital account transactions, while FDI is de facto capital account openness. This finding is 
only logical because the KAOPEN by conception and definition is more subject to 
institutional control, hence its mitigating effect on inequality. Two important points are worth 
noting here. (1) The negative effect of KAOPEN runs counter to mainstream literature, a 
justification of the instrumentality of formal institutions used in the analysis. Cobham (2001) 
concluded a decade ago on the effect of capital liberalization on poverty: “The key conclusion 
is that while the growth benefits of liberalization are far from clear for poorer countries, 
there may be significant costs in poverty terms. While further research is required in a 
number of areas identified, the main policy implication is that capital controls must be 
retained as part of the toolbox of pro-poor macroeconomic policymaking”. (2) The fact that 
FDI has a positive sign (though insignificant) was not unexpected. As far as we have 
reviewed, the two studies that have addressed the issue in African-inequality literature have 
found FDI to spur inequality. Using the same time span (1980-2002) and measure of 
inequality, Kai & Hamori (2010) and Asongu (2011a) have used the de facto FDI as a 
measure of capital account openness and found financial liberalization to fuel income-
inequality. A logical inference from our findings is that formal institutions are instrumental (at 
least) in making FDI insignificant, though more could still be done to change the negative 
sign if more sound inequality mitigating policies are implemented.  
Secondly, for more subtlety in the analysis, we have used two different measurements 
of trade liberalization: trade and exports. While trade has been found to decrease inequality, 
the effects of exports are not significant but have the right signs. With the primary sector 
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focused on exports in African countries, it is logical to expect trade liberalization to induce an 
equalizing impact on income-distribution. From an import standpoint, the influx of affordable 
Chinese goods could also explain this effect. The instrumentality of formal institutions in the 
appealing effect of trade could be explained from the weight of available empirical evidence 
from African ‘trade liberalization’-inequality literature that has substantially documented a 
positive trade-inequality nexus: cross-country evidences have shown the positive correlation 
between trade policies and income inequality through the channel of land abundance (Fischer, 
2000) and through political economy factors (Easterly, 2002); intra-household inequality 
through changes in employment opportunities between male and female household members 
(Winters, 2000), as well as through changes in the composition of the whole workforce 
(UNDP, 2003) and; overall inequality tends to rise in Africa even if more women are 
employed with the expansion of textile industries in the wake of trade liberalization 
(Blackden, 2003). 
Thirdly, the positive impact of political liberalization (democratization) on inequality 
is not unexpected in Africa. The advent of democratization does not really bring alongside 
good politicians that equitably share the fruits of economic prosperity. The case of many 
developing countries in Southeast Asia (Scott, 1972), India (Wade, 1985) and Turkey (Sayari, 
1977); post communist countries like Russia (Varese, 1997) and many Latin American 
countries upon the waves of democratization (Weyland, 1998) confirm this fact. It is in this 
vein that Asongu (2011b) advises that democracy once initiated in Africa should be 
accelerated to edge the appeals of authoritarian regimes and reap the benefits of time and level 
hypotheses.  
 Contrary to the negative effect of financial liberalization on inequality, the 
insignificance of the globalization freedom channels on poverty is consistent with recent 
literature. Arestis & Caner (2010) have found no statistically significant relationship between 
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the degree of capital account liberalization and poverty rate. The positive effect of political 
liberalization is consistent with the explanation provided above. 
 The antagonistic effects of economic freedom on inequality and poverty could be 
explained from the Pareto vs Gini debate. Accordingly, economic freedom has a substantial 
legal structure component which means that formal institutions are instrumental in economic 
freedom in comparison to other globalization channels. Hence, it could be established that 
formal institutions are instrumental in mitigating poverty but not inequality through the 
economic freedom channel. The explanation presupposes that, inequality according to Pareto 
is not bad provided the increase in wealth by some in the upper-income brackets is not at the 
expense of the worst-off (lower-income brackets). In this context, the Gini coefficient can be 
defined as an increase in the incomes of the rich with no change in the incomes of others. 
Hence, an increase in the Gini coefficient respects the Pareto rule. Hence, it could be said that 
economic freedom does not stop the wealthy from growing wealthier, but at the same time 
provides for conditions that mitigate poverty.  
 
4. Conclusion  
Are formal institutions instrumental in the effect globalization mechanisms have on 
the human face? If so, through which freedoms channels are poverty and inequality 
mitigated? With the instrumentality of formal institutions: (1) de jure financial liberalization 
(KAOPEN) has a positive income-redistribution impact while the de facto measure (FDI) 
does not; (2) political liberalization has a disequalizing effect and; (3) economic freedom has 
a positive (negative) effect on inequality (poverty). The findings broadly show that, despite 
the substantially documented negative incidences of some channels of globalization on 
poverty (and inequality), formal institutions have the capacity to device policies that will give 
capital openness, trade and economic liberalizations a human face. Social implications and 
policy options include: opening-up of financial accounts in tandem with financial and 
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institutional development, improvement of the investment atmosphere  to  curtail  capital  
flight  from  the  continent,  developing  an industrial  backbone  for  import-substitution  or 
export-led industry, adoption  of  openness  policies  in  a selective  and  gradual  manner,   
emphasizing on regional trade and building capacity, development of the agricultural sector 
with continuous government assistance, improvement of rural infrastructure, increasing  adult  
literacy  rate,  developing  human  resources,   combating  of  corruption  and, reducing 
wastages in government expenditure.  
Appendices 
Appendix 1: Summary statistics and presentation of countries  
Panel A: Summary Statistics 
  Mean S.D Min Max Obser. 
       
Inequality  GINI Coefficient  43.104 6.828 29.760 67.400 356 
Poverty  Poverty Head Count Ratio 66.320 24.439 12.820 96.570 73 
       
Financial Liberalization KAOPEN  -0.505 1.278 -1.843 2.477 392 
Foreign Direct Investment  2.777 4.252 -8.629 36.114 346 
       
Trade Liberalization Trade  68.687 29.967 21.574 187.68 401 
Exports  30.245 14.618 5.820 69.032 401 
       
Political Liberalization  Democracy 3.285 4.164 -8.000 10.000 420 
Polity IV  1.857 5.106 -7.000 10.000 420 
       
Other liberalization  Economic Freedom   6.118 0.632 4.710 7.820 250 
       
Control variable Economic Prosperity  4.273 3.710 -16.740 27.462 420 
       
 
 
 
Instrumental variables  
 
Corruption Control -0.471 0.560 -1.674 1.086 332 
Government Effectiveness -0.498 0.597 -1.742 0.807 320 
Rule of Law -0.518 0.608 -1.741 1.053 336 
Regulation Quality -0.391 0.526 -1.857 0.905 335 
Political Stability/No Violence -0.500 0.823 -2.530 0.996 336 
Corruption 3.130 1.090 1.000 6.400 290 
Voice and Accountability  -0.470 0.626 -1.805 1.047 336 
      
Panel B: Presentation of Countries 
Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Nigeria, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, 
Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia,  
S.D:Standard Deviation.  Min:Minimum. Max: Maximum. Obser: Observations.  
 
Appendix 2 : Correlation analysis 
           
GINI Poverty KAOPEN FDI Trade Exports Demo Polity IV EcoFree GDPg  
1.000 0.021 -0.032 0.094 0.144 0.154 0.241 0.352 0.273 -0.148 GINI 
 1.000 -0.052 -0.0008 -0.312 -0.466 0.241 0.303 -0.282 0.141 Poverty 
  1.000 0.060 0.049 0.113 0.192 0.120 0.673 0.077 KAOPEN 
   1.000 0.434 0.117 -0.023 0.111 0.258 0.110 FDI 
    1.000 0.843 0.185 0.258 0.335 -0.024 Trade 
     1.000 0.154 0.167 0.370 -0.070 Exports 
      1.000 0.774 0.373 0.114 Demo 
       1.000 0.254 0.032 Polity IV 
        1.000 0.098 EcoFree 
         1.000 GDPg 
           
GINI: Income Inequality Index. KAOPEN: De Jure measure of Capital Openness. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. Polity IV: Measure of 
Political liberalization. Demo: Democracy.  EcoFree: Economic Freedom. . GDPg: GDP growth rate.  
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Appendix 3: Variable definitions 
Variables Signs Variable definitions Sources 
    
Dependent Variable 
    
Inequality Index  GINI Income Inequality Index WDI (World Bank) 
    
Poverty  Poverty  Poverty Head Count Ratio (Less than 2 USD per day) WDI (World Bank) 
    
Independent Variables  
    
Financial Liberalization 1 KAOPEN De Jure Capital Openness Chinn & Ito (2002) 
    
Financial Liberalization 2 FDI  Foreign Direct Investment (% of GDP) WDI (World Bank) 
    
Trade Liberalization 1  Trade Imports + Exports of Commodities (% of GDP) WDI (World Bank) 
    
Trade Liberalization 2  Export Exports of Good & Services (% of GDP) WDI (World Bank) 
    
Political Liberalization 1 Democracy Level of institutionalized democracy (Estimate) WDI (World Bank) 
    
Political Liberalization 2 Polity IV Level of Polity democracy (Estimate) WDI (World Bank) 
    
Economic Freedom  EcoFree Economic Freedom Index  Gwartney et al. 
(2011). Economic 
Freedom Dataset 
   
Control Variable  
    
Economic Prosperity  GDPg GDP growth rate (annual %) WDI (World Bank) 
    
Instrumental Variables  
 
Corruption 
Control 
CC Control of Corruption (estimate): Captures perceptions of the extent to which 
public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms 
of corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and private interests.  
WDI (World 
Bank) 
    
Government 
Effectiveness 
GE Government Effectiveness (estimate): Measures the quality of public services, the 
quality and degree of independence from political pressures of the civil service, 
the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of 
governments’ commitments to such policies. 
WDI (World 
Bank) 
    
Rule of Law RL Rule of Law(estimate): Captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society and in particular the quality of 
contract enforcement, property rights, the police, the courts, as well as the 
likelihood of crime and violence. 
WDI (World 
Bank) 
    
Regulation 
Quality 
RQ Regulation Quality (estimate): Measured as the ability of the government to 
formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote 
private sector development.  
WDI (World 
Bank) 
    
Political 
Stability/No 
Violence 
PolS Political Stability/ No Violence (estimate): Measured as  the perceptions of the 
likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by 
unconstitutional and violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism. 
WDI (World 
Bank) 
    
Corruption CPI Corruption Perception Index  WDI (World 
Bank) 
    
Voice and 
Accountability  
V&A Voice and Accountability (estimate): Measures the extent to which a country’s 
citizens are able to participate in selecting their government and to enjoy freedom 
of expression, freedom of association, and a free media. 
WDI (World 
Bank) 
    
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators.  FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. PC: Principal Component. RL: Rule of Law. 
RQ: Regulation Quality. CC: Corruption Control. V& A: Voice & Accountability. PS: Political Stability. GE: Government Effectiveness. FDSD: Financial 
Development and Structure Database.  USD: United States Dollars.  
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